Bank bailout mark II: will it work? by Maximilian Hall (1247469)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
  1 
 
 
    
     
ISSN 1750-4171 
 
        
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
 
BANK BAILOUT MARK II : WILL IT WORK?  
 
 
Maximilian J. B. Hall 
 
 
WP 2009 - 01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
Dept Economics 
Loughborough University 
Loughborough  
LE11 3TU  United Kingdom 
Tel:  + 44 (0) 1509 222701 
Fax: + 44 (0) 1509 223910 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ec 
  2 
 
 
 
BANK BAILOUT MARK II : WILL IT WORK? 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Maximilian J. B. Hall 
 
 
 
Professor of Banking and Financial Regulation, 
Department of Economics, 
 Loughborough University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  3 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
On 19 January 2009, the UK Government unveiled a second comprehensive bank bailout 
plan. This followed the failure of its October bailout package to stimulate domestic 
lending, as intended. The various components of the new "rescue package" are duly 
explained and analysed in this article, which also addresses the likely future course of 
policy should the Government fail in its latest ambitions to stimulate lending and thereby 
revive the flagging economy 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Whilst the comprehensive bailout package of October 2008 saved, at least temporarily, the 
British banking system from collapse, it failed to stimulate bank lending, as intended.1 As 
a result, a desperate attempt was made by the Government in January 2009 to try to 
unblock lending channels as evidence emerged pointing to a serious contraction in the real 
economy and the withdrawal of foreign banks – Icelandic, Irish, EU and North American 
– and others (e.g. GE Capital) from UK loan markets. The package, revealed on 
19 January (HM Treasury, 2009a), comprised seven elements, and was supported by the 
FSA's decision to tweak the rules relating to banks' (i.e. those which benefited from the 
October 2008 bailout) use of internal models to generate regulatory capital charges – by 
switching from a 'point-in-time' to a 'through-the-cycle' assessment basis, the probability 
of loan default can now be averaged over the economic cycle rather than being based on 
the most recent, and hence more dismal, data – in order to increase the banks' capacity to 
lend in the downturn (FSA, 2009).2 The FSA has also indicated its willingness to treat a 
(post stress test) 4 per cent core tier one ratio (equivalent to a 6-7 per cent tier one ratio) as 
an "acceptable minimum", potentially providing further scope for an expansion in bank 
lending. 
 
 The detailed nature of the latest bailout package, which complements the 
Government's earlier introduction of a partial (50 per cent) guarantee on up to £20 billion 
of working capital loans to SMEs, is duly analysed in the next section before a wider 
assessment of the likely impact of the package and its chances of success is provided. The 
final section summarises and concludes. 
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THE BAILOUT PACKAGE OF JANUARY 2009 
 
 
 
The first element involves the Government, in return for a fee payable in cash or 
preference shares and verifiable commitments to support lending to "creditworthy" 
customers, insuring some of the risky assets currently held by UK-incorporated, authorised 
deposit-takers against extreme, unexpected  losses (HM Treasury, 2009b). Banks, 
however, will still be liable for a proportion – likely to be around 10 per cent – of any 
future losses on such assets beyond an agreed "first loss" amount before the insurance 
threshold is reached. And banks which have not yet written down such assets to reflect 
market prices will be asked to shoulder a higher proportion of possible future losses. The 
idea behind the scheme, which will be in place for at least five years and has recently been 
adopted in the US with respect to the bailouts of Citigroup and Bank of America, is to set 
a floor to the scale of losses which banks might incur on their existing loans and 
investments, thereby increasing certainty about bank solvency and enhancing financial 
stability. For the participating banks, this, in turn, should increase their willingness to lend 
as their need to hoard capital and liquidity against an uncertain future is correspondingly 
reduced. And, for the system as a whole, it should help de-freeze the interbank markets, 
thereby increasing each bank's capacity and willingness to lend. 
 
 The main problems with the scheme – which was preferred to the creation of a "bad 
bank", which would assume the illiquid toxic assets of the banks direct, because of the 
lack of up-front costs and the hope that merely offering to write the insurance will reduce 
the need for it as increased lending and economic activity are stimulated – lie in its 
practical application. For example, which assets should be insured, what premia should be 
charged and where should the insurance threshold be drawn? The initial focus will be on 
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the banks' most toxic assets (e.g. CDOs and MBS, which will continue to fall in value as 
long as house prices decline), as well as commercial property loans. Loans to SMEs and 
residential mortgages (including buy-to-let) may also feature; and RBS is to be the "guinea 
pig". As for "price", this is the same problem which the US authorities faced with their 
Troubled Asset Relief Programme, or "TARP", whose focus was switched from buying up 
toxic debt to bank re-capitalisation direct (Hall, 2009b); too high a premium and the banks 
won't play ball, probably accelerating their full nationalisation, whilst too low a premium 
will saddle taxpayers with larger contingent liabilities. And, with respect to the 
establishment of the insurance threshold, again drawing it too low (i.e. forcing the banks to 
shoulder more of their unexpected losses) or too high will have the same effects as 
outlined immediately above for imposing too high/low a premium. 
 
 The second strand of the 'economy bailout' package, as the Government prefers to call 
it, involves an extension of the time limit on the £250 billion Credit Guarantee Scheme for 
bank funding, announced as part of the October bailout package – see note 1 – from end-
April 2009 to end-2009. The focus here is on keeping open this line of attack on the 
currently-frozen interbank markets. 
 
 The third component relates to the introduction (to commence in April 2009) of a new 
guarantee scheme for triple-A rated asset-backed securities – initially involving new 
mortgages, but later to include corporate and consumer debt – as called for in the 'Crosby 
Report' (HM Treasury, 2008b). The intention here is to try and re-start the securitisation 
markets, thereby improving bank/building society and market liquidity and hence 
increasing bank lending capacity and reducing UK borrowers' cost of funds. Again, 
however, practical difficulties abound. How will the fees be determined (by auction, as 
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suggested by Crosby?)? How long should the scheme last for? And how can market 
distortions be minimised (e.g. to limit the subsidisation of poor-quality credits)? 
 
 Fourthly, the Government, as owner, is to force Northern Rock to slow the rate of 
contraction in its lending activities, thereby reversing the previous policy of trying to 
extract the fastest possible repayment of the bank's loan from the Bank  of England.3 
Whilst serving to limit the contraction in housing-related loans in the UK, and thereby 
limit house price deflation, the policy volte face does highlight the inherent contradiction 
in current government policy; on the one hand it wants to limit the severity of this 
recession by slowing the pace of credit contraction in the economy yet, on the other, it 
wishes to limit taxpayers' losses arising from its policy actions. Encouraging increased 
mortgage lending at a time when house prices are widely expected to fall by at least 
another 10 to 15 per cent on average before the floor is reached is not going to improve 
bank solvency; nor should would-be homeowners be induced to enter the housing market 
currently with the prospect of negative equity looming for an uncertain period of time. 
Similarly, forcing, exhorting or otherwise inducing banks to lend more to industry and 
individuals at a time of deepening recession, when output is plummeting and 
unemployment rising remorselessly, is again going to do little to boost individual banks' 
short-run profitability/solvency. Indeed, the danger is that adverse selection ensures that 
the banks end up with the credits that it least needs, as rising unemployment and falling 
demand create a new wave of "sub prime" (i.e. uncreditworthy) personal and corporate 
borrowers respectively. Moreover, it is not clear that stemming house price deflation, and 
hence slowing the pace of adjustment to a more sustainable level, nor indeed  keeping 
Northern Rock going, either as a public or privately-owned entity, is in the long-term 
interests of either taxpayers or the UK economy. 
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 Fifthly, the Government is set to revise the terms of its October 2008 bailout of RBS in 
recognition of the fact that demanding a 12 per cent coupon on the preference shares 
received – which must be redeemed before dividend payments to shareholders can resume 
– was too harsh (similar bailouts carried out subsequently elsewhere in the world have set 
the coupon payments at a much lower level (HM Treasury, 2009c). Accordingly, it is set 
to swap its preference shares for common stock as it boosts its stake in the bank from 58 
per cent to 70 per cent, a move designed, in part, to stimulate the banks' lending activities 
by up to £6 billion. 
 
 Sixthly, in order to ensure the availability of long-term bank liquidity, the period for 
which banks can swap illiquid assets for Treasury bills under the new Discount Window 
Facility has been increased from one month to one year, for an incremental fee of 25 basis 
points (Hall, 2009a). 
 
 Finally, the Government has given the nod to the Bank of England to start lending 
directly to UK businesses, as the Fed has been doing in the US now for some months with 
respect to US corporates, through the purchase of "high quality" (i.e. investment grade or 
better) private sector assets (including corporate bonds, commercial paper and some ABS). 
Under a new "Asset Purchase Facility", the Bank will thus initially purchase, through a 
newly-created subsidiary, up to £50 billion of commercial paper (Bank of England, 2009), 
with the Treasury indemnifying the Bank against loss. The purchases, however, will be 
"funded" (i.e. "sterilised"), with the Treasury issuing Treasury bills to finance the 
purchases, thereby nullifying the impact of the purchases on the money supply. The door 
has been opened, however, for the Bank to move towards "quantitative easing" (i.e. un-
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sterilised asset purchases, involving the "printing of money") should it prove necessary in 
the wake of its effective policy rates falling towards zero, a policy already prevalent in the 
US and adopted long ago in Japan in the face of seven years of deflation and near-zero 
nominal policy rates (Hall, 1999). Whilst the intention of the policy initiative is to widen 
large corporates' access to credit and reduce their costs of funding, the scale of potential 
losses that may ultimately fall upon taxpayers' shoulders is difficult to quantify. What 
seems "high quality" today may have lost its lustre by tomorrow if the rate of economic 
contraction continues at its current pace. And, if quantitative easing becomes a reality in 
the UK, the Bank needs to identify in advance a clear exit strategy if runaway inflation 
down the road is to be avoided. 
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A WIDER ASSESSMENT 
 
 
 
Such, then, is the nature of the Government's latest plan for arresting economic decline 
and preserving financial stability. But what are we to make of it? Accepting the premise 
that economic recovery cannot occur before financial stability is restored and "normality" 
returns to lending channels,4 is the current package of measures sensible? As alluded to 
above, when discussing attempts to re-invigorate mortgage lending, real concerns 
surround the wisdom of trying to slow the pace of adjustment to a more sustainable 
economy where house prices are lower, consumers and businesses are less indebted, the 
services sector (including financial services) is less dominant relative to manufacturing 
and the twin deficits – budgetary and the balance of payments – are more readily 
financeable.5 Of course, overnight "deleveraging" to achieve this more sustainable 
equilibrium would impose intolerable burdens on the real economy, and firms and 
individuals, but the extent to which this pain can be avoided, rather than simply deferred – 
to future generations – is not clear. Already concerned at the impact of the Government's 
fiscal stimuli,6 the markets are showing signs of alarm at the scale of the potential burden 
that bank/economy stabilisation initiatives are creating for the public finances, whatever 
the treatment of contingent liabilities in the national accounts. Whilst the Government's 
economic forecasts delivered at the time of the Pre-Budget Report have already proved to 
be woefully optimistic, as widely argued at the time, compounding market fears about the 
sustainability of current policy.7 These fears extend to the possibility that, at some stage, a 
ratings downgrade for long-term UK sovereign debt will follow that recently meted out to 
Greece, Spain and Portugal, thereby raising gilt funding costs and further deterring 
potential investors. Moreover, the rising cost of insuring against the possibility of a UK 
Government default on its debts in the CDS market is evidence that some, at least, believe 
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such a likelihood is certainly not negligible, raising the prospect – however remote – of the 
UK following the likes of Iceland, Hungary, Ukraine, Pakistan and others (possibly 
including Ireland further down the road) to the doors of the IMF. As noted by many 
(including the IMF – IMF, 2009),8 and in defiance of government assertions to the 
contrary, the UK economy has always been one of the worst-placed industrialised nations 
to weather the current economic and financial storm because of the relative size of its 
housing bubble, the extent of its people's indebtedness and the significance of the 'City' 
and financial services more generally to domestic economic prosperity. And the 
Government's failure to better balance the books in the good times – a legacy of the Prime 
Minister's stint as Chancellor – has left the public finances seriously exposed to the 
worsening economic and financial climate. 
 
 As for the future direction of policy, and assuming some unconstrained action is 
possible, the current debate is focussing on the relative merits of full (but temporary) 
nationalisation of further elements of the banking sector compared with what some 
characterise as the "creeping nationalisation" of current policy. Further steps down this 
road – nationalisation of the whole system is impossible as the banks' assets amount to 
well over four times GDP – however, whilst giving the Government greater leverage over 
lending policy will not resolve the fundamental problem alluded to earlier. How can 
increasing bank lending in a severe downturn be reconciled with the objective of 
minimising taxpayer exposure to government bailouts? Is it unambiguously the case that, 
without such governmental action, current taxpayers would be even more exposed? And 
what about the plight of future generations of taxpayers? Is it the least bad policy option 
available but one that nevertheless promises, at least, to deliver a "tomorrow", some time 
in the future?9 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
The package of measures revealed on 19 January 2009 represents the Government's final 
attempt, short of full nationalisation of one or more of our leading banks, to re-invigorate 
lending to the domestic economy. This followed the failure of its October bailout plan to 
kickstart lending, as intended. As explained above, however, there are serious doubts 
surrounding the likely efficacy of the rescue package, and widespread market concerns 
about its likely impact on public finances. It remains to be seen if further steps down the 
road to nationalisation of the complete banking system, and the concomitant consequences 
of this action for taxpayers, can be avoided.10 
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Endnotes 
                                               
1
  The package comprised: an increase, from £100 billion to £200 billion, in the amount of bank funding 
available under the 'Special Liquidity Scheme' of the Bank of England; a recapitalisation of the UK 
deposit-taking sector using £25 billion (later increased to £37 billion) of taxpayers' money in return for 
which banks had to restrict dividend payouts and executive compensation and commit to lending to small 
businesses and homeowners; and, in return for the payment of a commercial fee, a public guarantee of up 
to £250 billion of banks' new short- and medium-term debt issuance. [See HM Treasury, 2008a, for 
further details; and, for an analysis, see Hall, 2009a.] 
2
  Whilst such a measure represents a further attempt to address the long-standing problem of "pro-
cyclicality" within Basel II (see, for example, Hall, 2004), it is not without its critics. Firstly, it leaves the 
FSA open to the charge that it has been bounced into making the move, thereby compromising its 
perceived political independence. And secondly, as the experience with the savings and loans industry in 
the US in the 1980s revealed, relaxing capital requirements in a crisis is a policy fraught with danger, as 
is the recent decision to relax the mark-to-market requirements for some of the banks' trading book 
assets. 
3
  Indeed, the bank has been so successful in meeting its targets that, controversially, staff are to be 
rewarded with bonuses of around 10 per cent. In order to repay the Bank of England so quickly, however 
– the debt outstanding to the Bank is now down to around £11.5 billion – the bank's actions have not 
only fuelled the contraction in mortgage lending in the UK but have also indirectly caused a reduction in 
the amount of new funding available to first-time buyers as much of the market's lending activity has 
comprised ex-Northern Rock borrowers re-mortgaging with other lenders. 
4
  It should be appreciated, however, that some of the recent slowdown in domestic credit provision is due 
to a natural curtailment of credit demand as the recession bites. 
5
  The Government, however, remains of the opinion that, despite record planned issuance of gilts - £146.4 
billion in the financial year ending 4 April 2009, three times greater than in the previous year and the 
biggest annual amount ever, and averaging £134.2 billion over the next five years – and the dramatic rise 
in planned global public sector bond issuance (put at around $3 trillion for 2009, three times the amount 
raised in 2008), the UK Government will not face particularly acute problems, on either the price or 
quantity front. As reasons for this relatively sanguine view they cite: continued demand arising from 
investors' low appetite for risk; the apparent recent stimulus given to overseas sales by the fall in the 
value of sterling (36 per cent of outstanding gilt issuance was in foreign hands at end-September 2008); a 
relatively low level for the UK's current debt to GDP ratio compared with other industrialised nations; 
and the increased demand from domestic banks that will result from changes to the FSA's liquidity 
adequacy assessment regime (see FSA, 2008). The middle two of these factors, however, could change 
rapidly if market circumstances change (i.e. if fears of a deeper sterling crisis or of large scale losses on 
bank bailouts emerge; and, if and when risk appetite returns, investors may not necessarily favour UK 
public sector securities over UK corporate or overseas debt. 
   As for the deficit on the balance of payments, it is hoped that the sustained fall in the value of sterling, 
apart from reducing the risk of deflation appearing, will eventually boost the trade account, 
notwithstanding the decline in global demand, and act as an offset to falling sales of North Sea oil as 
reserves become depleted. 
6
  The Pre-Budget Report, unveiled on 24 November 2008, revealed the Government's intentions. A £20 
billion fiscal stimulus, amounting to around 1 per cent of GDP, would be delivered for just over a year to 
try and dampen the severity of the downturn (by around 0.5 per cent of GDP). The main expansionary 
forces derive from an immediate cut in VAT – from 17½ per cent to 15 per cent – programmed to last 
until end-2009, and the bringing forward of capital expenditure from future years. To convince the 
markets of the Government's commitment to returning to fiscal "responsibility" as soon as circumstances 
allow – 2015/16 is the suggested date – the Government simultaneously announced a series of deferred 
tax rises and planned expenditure cuts. On its own reckoning, however, the implications of its policies 
for the public finances are profound. Public borrowing is forecast to hit a record level of £118 billion 
(equivalent to 8 per cent of GDP) in 2009/10 falling to a "prudent" level only by 2015/16. And 
government net debt is forecast to reach 57 per cent of GDP by 2012/13, well above the current preferred 
limit of 40 per cent of GDP, exceeding £1 trillion for the first time in 2012. And these projections are 
based on what are likely to prove wildly over-optimistic assumptions concerning growth forecasts (see 
IFS, 2009) – the economy is expected to contract by between 0.75 per cent and 1.25 per cent in 2009, 
with growth resuming in the second half of 2009 to deliver growth of between 1.5 per cent and 2 per cent 
in 2010 and 3.25 per cent in 2011/12 and thereafter – and the scale of additional "efficiency savings" that 
can be squeezed from the public sector. As noted in footnote 5 above, the scale of additional gilt funding 
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that these projections imply may yet prove unsustainable; and foreign investors may balk at maintaining 
their investments at current levels even if yields are substantially raised to compensate them. 
7
  The pound stood at a 23-year low against the US dollar of $1.35 at the close of business on 23 January 
2009 after the announcement of a 1.5 per cent fall in GDP in the last quarter of 2008, confirming the UK 
to be in recession. On a trade-weighted basis, the pound is down by over 30 per cent since 2007. The 
sell-off reflected growing fears about the state of the real economy – unemployment had risen to a 10-
year high of 6.1 per cent in the three months to November 2008, before the more recent surge in layoffs, 
which will almost certainly raise the December headline count above the 2 million level – and concerns 
about the likely impact of the Government's various support packages on already soaring government 
borrowing figures. Stock market activity also suggests there is a widespread feeling that RBS will soon 
end up totally in governmental hands, possibly joined by Lloyds Banking Group, and that Barclays Bank 
will need state support of one kind or another (as private investors balk at recapitalisation), thereby 
diluting existing shareholders' interests. 
8
  The IMF's latest forecast for the UK is that GDP will fall by 2.8 per cent in 2009, a much larger 
contraction than that foreseen for any other advanced nation. 
9
  The same dilemma faced the Bank of England in August/September 2007 when it agonised over whether 
or not it should extend the scope of its emergency liquidity provision in advance of Northern Rock's 
request for a liquidity lifeline (Hall, 2008). Although it was right to be concerned at the moral hazard 
implications of bailing out wayward bankers – long-run damage is almost certain to be done to the real 
economy, threatening future instability – critics argued that the circumstances at the time were so dire 
that, without such action, there would be no tomorrow, so what's the point of worrying about it now. In 
other words, action needs to be taken now to put out the fire; the debate about how to prevent another 
one occurring is of secondary importance.  
10
  The Treasury is also thought to be working on the possible creation of a 'bad bank', as a complement to 
the existing package of measures. 
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